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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM J. COLMAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
A. J. BUTKOVICH and GENEVA A.
BUTKOVICH, husband and wife; G
W. ANDERSON and JEANNE D.
BANKS, and all unknown piefrsons
who claim any interest in the subject
matter of this action,
Defendants-Appellants. J

Case No.
13868

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

Because Respondent has chosen to ignore the fatal
defects in his title to the property involved in this action,
but instead has claimed the benefit of the Marketable
Record Title Act, and challenged the adequacy of Appellants' title, Appellants deem it necssary to file this reply
to the new issues raised in Respondent's Brief.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants reaffirm their statement of facts in their
initial brief and make the following ckrifications of assertions made in Respondent's statement of facts:
On page 4 of Respondent's Brief it is asserted that
the property described on the Warranty Deed from Robert T. Banks to WUiam J. Colman "had been vested in
1916 in The Assets Corporation and in Park City Townsite," presumably referring to the Park City Townsite
Company. This statement is untrue since The Assets
Corporation never had any more than a one-fifth interest
in "the Park City Townsite" which is not the same description in the deed to Colman (See Ex. 11A). Furthermore, the Park City Townsite Company received a defective Sheriff's Deed, after a defective Sheriff's sale,
which, in any event, was subject to all prior interests in
the property that had not been conveyed. As pointed
out on page 11 of Appellants' Brief there were prior unconveyed interests in the property which constituted
defects in the title of these two corporations.
Respondent further states on page 4 of his brief
that "no other title claimant appears of record from 1916
until the 1968 Warranty Deed to Pkintiff." This statement, of course, ignores the Auditor's Tax Deeds to
Summit County in 1915 and 1940 and the deeds from
Summit County to Butkoviches in 1964 and 1965.
Respondent again claims that his expert witness,
Robert B. Jones, testified that he could not locate the
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property described on the deeds to Butkoviches. However, when Jones was given the complete description
on the deeds, he testified that the property could be located (Tr. 33-34). See also Tr. 90-91 where it was established without dispute that the initials "P. C." are a
standard, well-known and commonly accepted designation for property in the Park City Townsite.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF'S RELIANCE UPON THE MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT IS MISPLACED SINCE HE DOES NOT HAVE THE
REQUIRED "UNBROKEN CHAIN OF TITITLE OF RECORD" NOR IS THE BANKS'
AFFIDAVIT A "TITLE TRANSACTION,"
PLAINTIFF HAS NO "COLOR OF TITLE"
NOR "PRIMA FACIE" TITLE.
Respondent's Brief claims that his tide is "direct"
starting with a Sheriff's Dead to the Park City Townsite
Company and a deed to The Assets Corporation in 1916.
This starting point, of course, ignores the seven defects
in the title leading up to those two deeds. These defects
are listed on pages 11 and 12 of Appellants' Brief.
Plaintiff then assarts that the 1968 affidavit of Robert T. Banks "fully explains" how Banks received his
interest in the property from the Park City Townsite
Company and The Assets Corporation. Far from being
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a document which "fully explains" this asserted transfer
of interest, the Banks' affidavit
1)

states on its face that The Assets Corporation was only a part owner of the property,

2) describes no real property but refers only
to "the remaining assets of said Assets Corporation,,"
3) is hearsay and therefore inadmissible to establish any of the facts which it asserts,
4)

is a self-serving recital incompetent as evidence to establish title, State Road Commission v. Thompson, 17 U. 2d 412, 413 P. 2d
603 (1966),

5)

assumes, incorrectly, that a resolution of
one corporation to "take over the affairs" of
another corporation may legally accomplish
that take-over,

6)

is false and fraudulent, since it is contradictory to the minutes of the directors'
meeting of The Assets Corporation, to which
it refers, and to Banks' own letter suggesting
the fraud set forth in the affidavit, and

7)

is ineffective to convey or affect title to any
real property, since it was not "entitled to
recordation" without the legal description
of the real property allegedly affected thereby. § 57-3-10, U. C. A., Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Utah 55, 1 P. 2d 242, 244 (1931).

This affidavit, upon which Colman vests his entire
claim to title, has abosluateiy no effect to establish title
in anyone. It certainly is not the "prima facie evidence"
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of title claimed by Colman in his brief. Prima facie title
"is shown by a grant from someone who held possession,
or by such grant and possession under it by the grantee
. . . " Music Service Corporation v. Walton, 20 U. 2d 16>
432 P. 2d 334, 336 (1967). Since Colman failed to show
possession by himself or his grantor, he has failed to
establish a prima facie title and his complaint should
have been dismissed.
Colman claims, on page 15 of his brief, that he has
"an unbroken chain of title of record" to the property
for over forty years as required by the Marketable Record Title Act. He has obviously misread that Act and,
therefore, the pertinent sections thereof are set out in
full:
Section 57-9-1, U. C, A.
Any person having the legal capacity to own
land in this state, who has an unbroken chain
of title of record to any interest in land for forty
years or more, shall be deemed to have a marketable record title to such interest as defined in
section 57-9-8, subject only to the matters stated
in section 57-9-2. A person shall be deemed to
have such an unbroken chain of title when the
official public records disclose a conveyance or
other title transaction, of record not less than
forty years at the time the marketability is to
be determined, which said conveyance or other
title faransaction purports to create such interest,
either in
(1)

the person claiming such interest or

(2)

some ofcher person from whom, by one
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or more conveyances or other title transactions
of record, such purported interest has become
vested in the person claiming such interest:
with nothing appearing of record, in either case,
purporting to divest such claimant of such purported interest.
To claim the benefit of the Marketable Record Title
Act Colman must prove a conveyance to him more
than forty years ago or one or more conveyances or "other
title transactions" of record to him from some other person to whom a conveyance was made more than forty
years ago, with nothing appearing of record "purporting
to divest" Colman of his purported interest. Since the
deed to him was not made more than forty years ago,
he must rely on the second alternative. Obviously, the
affidavit of Banks is not a conveyance but is it a "title
transaction" within the terms of the statute? This phrase
is defined by the statute as follows:
Section 57-9-8(6), U. C. A.
The words "title transaction" mean any
transaction affecting title to any interest in land,,
including title by will or descent, title by tax
deed, or by trustee's, referee's, guardian's, executor's, administrator's, master in chancery's, or
sheriff's deed, or decree of any court, as well as
warranty deed, quitclaim deed, or mortgage.
This definition limits the term "title transaction" to
various kinds of deeds and probate proceedings, all of
which are effective to pass title to real property. The
phrase in the definition referring to "any transaction
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affecting title" can certainly not include the Bank's affidavit, even if it were accepted at face value. This Court
has held such hearsay and self-serving documents completely ineffective to convey any interest in property.
State Road Commission v. Thompson, 17 U. 2d 412, 416
P. 2d 603 (1966). The affidavit, therefore, clearly has
no effect upon the title. To claim that the ex parte,
self-serving, false and hearsay affidavit of Banks is a
"title transaction" within the terms of the Marketable
Record Title Act, as Colman claims, is asking this Court
to close its eyes to reality and integrity.
Furthermore, Colman has no unbroken chain of title
of record because there are documents appearing of record "purporting to divest" the interest of his predecessors,
namely, the Auditor's Tax Deeds to Summit County and
the deeds from Summit County to the Butkoviches.
These recorded documents, according to § 57-9-1, U. C.
A., deprive Colman of his unbroken chain of title of record, and, therefore, Colman has no marketable record
title. However, even if he had a marketable record title,
the Act makes such title expressly subject to the matters
in § 57-9-2, the applicable provisions of which are:
Section 57-9-2, II. C, A.
The marketable record title shall be subject
to:
(1) All interests and defects which are inherent in the muniments of which such chain of
record title is formed;
, ,
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(4) Any interest arising out of a title transaction which has been recorded subsequent to
the effective date of the root of title from which
the unbroken chain of title of record is started;
This section would make Colman's title, assuming
he had title, subject to the tax title of the Butkoviches,
since the tax title is an "interest arising out of a title
transaction which has been recorded subsequent" to the
root of title. Ctolman's title would further be subject to
"all interests and defects which are inherent in the muniments" forming his chain of record; that is, all interests
and defects in the Banks' affidavit upon which Colman
relies. See the list of defects in that affidavit on page
4, above.
The discussion on page 17 of Respondent's Brief concerning documents "purporting to divest" pursuant to
§ 57-9-1, U. C. A., attempts to show that the deed from
Banks to Colman purports to divest the grantor's title
and, therefore, Colman must have title. No one will
argue that the deed from Banks to Colman divests Banks
of whatever title he had. Since Banks had no title to
convey, Colman has a cause of action against Banks, or
his estate^ under the warranties in his deed. However,
Colman has completely misread the Marketable Record
Title Act because it provides that any document "purporting to divest" title prevents a marketable record
title from arising. Therefore, Colman's argument that his
deed purports to divest title from his grantor defeats his
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own claim to the benefits of the Marketable Reco(rd Title
Act. The deed to him is in fact a "wild deed," since his
grantor nowhere appears in the chain of tittle, and is
therefore ineffective to convey any title.
POINT II.
THE VALIDITY OF APPELLANTS' TAX
TITLE IS NOT RELEVANT IN THIS PROCEEDING. NEVERTHELESS, THEIR TAX
TITLE IS VALID AND THEIR PROPERTY
DESCRIPTION IS ADEQUATE.
In Point I of Appellants' initial brief it was established that Colman, as plaintiff, could prevail in this case
only on the strength of his own title and not on any
weakness of defendants'. It was further established that
Colman had no standing to challenge the tax title of
Butkoviiches even if that tax title might be defective.
Nevertheless, Colman ignores all of the cases and the
long established law on these points, and then proceeds
to challenge the validity of the tax title. His sole claim
of authority for this tack is dictum from Huntington City
v. Peterson, 30 U. 2d 407, 518 P. 2d 1246 (1974). Contrary to Colman's claim, that case does not stand for
the proposition that the burden is on the tax title holder
to establish his title by showing the regularity of all tax
proceedings. That case held that the tax assessment and
levy were not made prior to the time the tax-exempt
city acquired titles therefore the tax assessment was invalid and the tax sale and tax deed were void. That was
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the only ground upon which the plaintiff challenged the
defendants' tax title. Furthermore, the plaintiff in that
case first established its own title before challenging the
defendants' tax title. In the case now before this Court
the plaintiff, Colman, has not established his own title
and therefore has no standing to challenge the defendants' title.
To further emphasize Colman's burden to prove his
own title, rather than just claim that his title is better
than the tax title, it should be noted that the plaintiff
in a quiet title action cannot prevail, even when all defendants are in default, unless he produces evidence of
his title and possession. Section 78-40-13, U. C. A., requires such evidence to be produced, even where a default
judgment is sought, and requires the Court to "enter
judgment in accordance with the evidence and the law."
Colman must affirmatively establish his title and, having
failed to do so, would not even be entitled to a default
judgment.
In challenging the adequacy of the description in
the tax title involved here, Colman relies on several cases,
all of which involve legal descriptions that applied to
more than one parcel of land or to land that was nonexistent. In Edwards v. City of Santa Paula, 292 P. 2d
31, 36 (Calif., 1956), the property was described as Lots
20 to 31 "being a portion of Lot 14, Block 68, City of
Santa Paula, Map No. 20." The problem existed because there were two maps of that designation, one of
which showed a Lot 14 "so placed and of such a size that
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lots 20 to 31 could not possibly be parts of it," and the
other of which showed two bits numbered 14, neither of
which could contains lots 20 to 31. The description being
impossible to locate, the deed was held to be defective.
In Meyerkort v. Warrington, 19 So. 2d 433 (Miss.
1944), the description was "Pt. Sec. 28 Tp, 12 R. 3 E,"
with other parcels similarly described. With no indication as to whether the township is North or South and
no designation of which pari: of the section was intended,
this description obviously could not be located. The same
defect, that is, failure to designate the township and
range, resulted in a defective title in Burton v. Hoover,
93 Utah 498, 74 P. 2d 652 (1937). That case, however,
has been limited by the later case of Keller v. Chournos,
102 Utah 535, 133 P. 2d 318 (1943), which considered
the failure to designate the township "North" and the
range "West" not fatal where the location in Box Elder
County must of necessity be "North" and "West". The
court took judicial notice of such facts.
The description here, property in Summit County,
Utah, to wit: "all unplatted land in this Block (29 P. C.)
and all land West of this Blk." with reference to the sale
for delinquent taxes against the prior owners, D. C.
McLaughlin Estate and Park City Townsite, refers to
only one possible tract of land. The designation "P. C."
is a standard, well-known abbreviation for property in
the Park City Townsite in Summit County (Tr. 90-91),
and such abbreviations "having local significance" are
authorized by § 59-11-6, U. C. A. This property descrip-
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tion does not run West "to the Pacific Ocean, to the West
line of Utah, Summit County or to the summit of the
next mountain" as Colman so facetiously suggests. It
obviously runs to the West boundary of the Park City
Townsiite. There is only one black 29 in the Park City
Townsite and only one Park City Townsiite in Summit
County, Utah. Ownership in all the property West of
the Park City Townsite was in the United States Government and was therefore not assessed (Tr. 88-90).
There were no surrounding landowners to be confused by
this description. It could not apply to any other land.
Ferguson v. Mathis, 96 Utah 442, 85 P. 2d 827 (1938),
relied upon by Colman, held the description of the property involved to be sufficient and not misleading and
relied upon tesitimony of numerous witnesses that the
alleged faults in the description were common parlance
and that there was no other land in the County to which
the description would apply. This is also true here. Further, the quotation on pages 6 and 7 of Respondent's
Brief from Edwards v. City of Santa Paula, above, conveniently omitted the following from the middle of the
quotation, without any indication of the omission:
"If the land is described by some name or designation, evidence will be received for the purpose
of showing that the tract in controversy was
well and generally known by that name or designation."
Under Colman's own authorities the tax title description in tins case must be considered adequate and
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valid. No one was misled or confused. Colman's predecessors in title have not paid any taxes on this property at least since 1935! Surely they did not expect this
property to be free of the taxes all other landowners are
required to pay to preserve their ownership! They knew
that it would have been sold for taxes and should not be
allowed to come in at this late date to attempt reconstruction of their title by fraud and challenge the validity
of the County's tax title. This was certainly one of the
motivating factors behind the statutes of limitations in
sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2, U. C. A., barring any
challenge after four yeara. See Point II of Appellants'
Brief. These limitations statutes apply whether the tax
title is valid or not. § 78-12-5.3, U. C. A. It is interesting
that all of the cases relied upon by Colman were decided
long before the passage of these limitations statutes and
he is therefore left to rely upon ancient rulings superceded by modern statutes and cases.
CONCLUSION
Because of the numerous defects in plaintiff's claim
of title, he had no title and therefore no standing to challenge the title of defendants. His reliance upon the Marketable Record Title Act is without merit since the Banks'
affidavit is not a "title transaction" and he does not
have an "unbroken chain of title of record." He does
not have a prima fade title because he failed to show a
conveyance from the record holder or possession in himself or his grantor. His challenge of the adequacy of
the defendants' tax title was barred by the statutes of
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limitations and by his lack of standing. Furthermore, the
tax title description was adequate because it could apply
to only one piece of property. Neither the record owner
nor anyone else was confused or misled by that description. Therefore, the decree quieting title in plaintiff
should be reversed and title to the property in dispute
should be quieted in defendants.
Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, CLARK MARSH
Ralph J. Marsh
Attorney for Appellants
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